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How Capital Structure Influences Diversification Performance:  
A Transaction Cost Perspective 
 
 
Abstract   
Extant theories agree that debt should inhibit diversification, but predict opposing performance 
consequences. While agency theory predicts that debt should lead to higher performance for 
diversifying firms, transaction cost economics (TCE) predicts that more debt will lead to lower 
performance for firms expanding into new markets. Our empirical tests on a large sample of 
Japanese firms support TCE by showing that firms accrue higher returns from leveraging their 
resources and capabilities into new markets when managers are shielded from the rigors of the 
market governance of debt, particularly bond debt. Furthermore, we find that the detrimental 
effects of debt are exacerbated for R&D intensive firms, and that debt is not necessarily harmful 
to firms that are either contracting or managing a stable portfolio of markets.  
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“Equity is soft; debt is hard. Equity is forgiving; debt is insistent. Equity is a pillow; debt is a 
dagger… Equity lulls a company's management to sleep, forgiving its sins more readily than a 
deathbed priest… But put a load of debt on that same company's books and watch what happens 
when its operating profits begin to fall off even a little bit” ~ G. Bennett Stewart (1991: 580-581) 
 
 
Both product and international diversification have the potential to generate economic 
rents from leveraging critical resources and capabilities across multiple markets (Barney, 1991; 
Hitt et al., 2006; Teece et al., 1997). Inappropriate diversification, however, can destroy firm 
value (Hoskisson & Hitt, 1990). As managers’ goals can diverge from those of owners and 
lenders, governance mechanisms are needed to ensure the pursuit of appropriate strategies that 
enhance firm value (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Flawed governance mechanisms foster 
inadequate monitoring and misaligned incentives that result in inappropriate diversification 
strategies and poor financial performance (Hitt et al., 2006; Hoskisson & Hitt, 1990; Wan et al., 
2011). Prior research has explored the governance role of ownership structure (David et al., 
2010; Tihanyi et al., 2003), business group affiliation (Kim et al., 2004), and national 
institutional context (Wan & Hoskisson, 2003) in shaping the performance consequences of 
diversification strategies. 
A firm’s capital structure (i.e., the relative mix of debt and equity capital) is an important 
governance mechanism that shapes monitoring and incentives (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Williamson, 1988) and impacts corporate diversification strategy (Kochhar, 1996). While 
considerable research has explored how the governance exercised by equity owners shapes the 
performance consequences of diversification (for a review see Connelly et al., 2010), the 
influence of lenders on diversification remains unexplored. This gap is surprising considering 
that the suppliers of debt, just like equity, use governance mechanisms to safeguard their 
investments (Williamson, 1988). In fact, debt can be even more salient because it accounts for 
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over 90 percent of all new external financing (Mayer, 1988). Accordingly, we study the role of 
debt in shaping the performance consequences of diversification strategies. 
Extant theories yield opposing predictions about the impact of debt on the performance 
consequences of diversification. Debt contractually obligates managers to a repayment schedule 
and default gives lenders the right to recoup their assets through bankruptcy (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). According to AT, the high-powered incentives posed by the threat of bankruptcy induce 
managers to eschew excessive diversification and only pursue value-enhancing diversification 
(Jensen, 1986). Transaction cost economics (TCE), by contrast, argues that the high-powered 
incentives preclude the forbearance and discretion needed for exploring and capitalizing on 
opportunities in new markets as they arise (Kochhar, 1996). Both theories agree that debt inhibits 
diversification, but predict opposing performance consequences: debt leads to higher 
performance according to AT, but lower performance according to TCE.  
Existing empirical research has emphasized direct relationships between diversification 
and debt and has not directly addressed the governance role of debt in shaping the performance 
consequences of diversification. Most research investigates the role of diversification in the 
choice of debt financing. Diversification helps to reduce earnings volatility because the cash 
flows across the firm’s various markets will be imperfectly correlated, thereby allowing firms to 
employ more debt in their capital structure and hence enjoy the concomitant cost of capital and 
tax benefits (Barton & Gordon, 1988; Kim et al., 1993; Kochhar & Hitt, 1998; Lim et al., 2009; 
Low & Chen, 2004; Lowe et al., 1994). Empirical research has also explored the reciprocal 
relationship of debt on diversification (Yoshikawa & Phan, 2005) and found that debt tends to 
inhibit related diversification (Chatterjee & Wernerfelt, 1991) and to foster restructuring through 
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reductions in diversification (Gibbs, 1993). Empirical research has not, however, investigated 
how the governance role of debt shapes the performance consequences of diversification. 
In the following sections, we first draw on AT to link capital structure to changes in 
diversification. Next, we draw on the RBV to explicate the critical role of key strategic resources 
and capabilities in reaping the maximal possible returns from diversification. Following that, we 
draw on TCE to explain how capital structure can influence the returns to diversification. In 
doing so, we make several important contributions to the strategy literature. First, we show that 
capital structure can strongly influence the success of new market entry. Second, we make a 
theoretical contribution by demonstrating that TCE can serve as a useful bridge between the 
RBV and AT because it helps to clarify the appropriate form of governance for strategic 
resources. Third, we extend our core arguments to explicate the contingencies that shape the 
relationship between debt, diversification, and performance. Specifically, we argue that: debt is 
more detrimental to R&D intensive firms; bond debt is more detrimental than bank debt; debt is 
more detrimental to firms increasing diversification than firms decreasing diversification; and 
that debt can potentially be beneficial to diversified firms that are not actively expanding. Our 
empirical tests on a large sample of Japanese firms support our arguments. Finally, although our 
empirical tests are based on Japanese firms, our theory is developed using the general tenets of 
AT, the RBV, and TCE. Hence, we our results should generalizable to all contexts where the 
institutional environment gives teeth (or daggers, as our opening quote would put it) to lenders.  
Theory and Hypotheses 
The Relationship between Diversification and Capital Structure 
While debt financing has benefits for firms because it helps shield some income from 
taxes and can lower the firm’s overall cost of capital, it also poses risks because failure to make 
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periodic interest and loan payments can lead to financial distress and bankruptcy (Kochhar, 
1996). Operating in multiple markets helps firms to diversify risk and smooth earnings volatility, 
thereby allowing them to reap the potential benefits of carrying more debt. Accordingly, research 
in economics and strategy has shown that greater levels of product diversification tend to lead to 
higher levels of debt (Barton & Gordon, 1988; Kochhar & Hitt, 1998; Lim et al., 2009; Lowe et 
al., 1994). However, empirical evidence on international diversification is more equivocal (Low 
& Chen, 2004). Although Chkir and Cosset (2001) did find a positive relationship between 
international diversification and leverage, other studies have found a negative relationship 
(Burgman, 1996; Chen et al., 1997; Lee & Kwok, 1988), and others have even argued that debt 
capacity will vary according to the riskiness of the countries entered (Kwok & Reeb, 2000). 
From a purely financial perspective, it is quite reasonable that diversified cash flows 
should allow most firms to carry more debt. Furthermore, if debt has tax or cost of capital 
benefits, or if most firms simply follow some sort of pecking-order model of capital structure 
(Myers & Majluf, 1984), then diversification should positively influence debt levels. We believe 
that one of the reasons for the mixed empirical results may be the complex relationship between 
diversification and capital structure. While diversification should influence capital structure, it is 
also endogenous in that it is likely a function of other strategic or governance variables that also 
influence capital structure. Moreover, the relationship between the two is likely to be reciprocal. 
While ex post (i.e., after a firm has diversified) diversified cash flows help support higher debt 
levels, ex ante (i.e., before diversification) debt should constrain a firm’s ability to diversify. 
Frictions in capital markets increase the cost of external capital relative to internally 
generated funds, thereby inducing firms with insufficient financial slack to sometimes forego 
valuable investment opportunities (Myers & Majluf, 1984). Hence, if a firm has high debt levels, 
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managers will have both less free cash flow to invest in new markets and will also have less 
leeway to borrow capital to fund market expansion. Accordingly, following prior research 
(Chatterjee & Wernerfelt, 1991; Gibbs, 1993), we present a baseline hypothesis that ex ante, high 
levels of debt will constrain a firm’s ability to further diversify.  
Hypothesis 1 (baseline): Debt has a negative impact on changes in diversification. 
 
Although firms with high levels of debt will generally be less inclined to increase 
diversification, the influence of debt on diversification is not deterministic, and at least some 
firms with modest to high levels of debt will nonetheless expand into new markets. The 
performance consequences of such diversification initiatives, however, are less clear. Jensen’s 
(1986) free cash flow theory suggests that managers may attempt to ‘build their empires’ by 
entering new markets if they have discretion over ample free cash flows (Brush et al., 2000), 
potentially at a cost to shareholders (Kim et al., 2004). According to AT, high debt levels should 
increase the returns to diversification because debt reduces the free cash flows that managers 
have discretion over, thereby curtailing excessive growth that destroys value (Chatterjee & 
Wernerfelt, 1991; Gibbs, 1993). Furthermore, debt increases the incentives to keep performance 
strong (Hoskisson et al., 1994; O'Brien & David, 2010), thereby compelling managers to only 
enter new markets if the expected returns are promising. Yet, as we explain below, consideration 
of the governance of strategic assets leads to divergent predictions.  
The Resource Based View and Diversification 
Diversification into multiple product and geographic markets has been the focus of much 
research in strategy and international business (Hitt et al., 2006; Hoskisson & Hitt, 1990; Palich 
et al., 2000). Firms can generate rents from the intra-firm sharing of core resources (Barney, 
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1991; Kim et al., 1993; Teece, 1982; Teece et al., 1997), and hence expansion into new markets 
can provide a firm with a variety of opportunities to reduce costs and increase revenues 
(Geringer et al., 2000; Lu & Beamish, 2004). Market expansion can also provide substantial 
opportunities to develop new resources and capabilities, which can lead to positive spillovers that 
can be applied in subsequent diversification moves (Chang, 1995). However, as noted by 
Penrose (1956), expansion into new markets may be motivated by not just attractive 
opportunities in the new market, but also by poor prospects in the firm’s existing markets 
(Chang, 1992; Christensen & Montgomery, 1981; Rumelt, 1974; Stimpert & Duhaime, 1997). 
Despite the potential promise of unrelated diversification for poor performers, scholars since 
Rumelt (1974) have argued that diversifiers should generally exhibit better performance if they 
enter related markets (Bettis, 1981; Datta et al., 1991) because the firm is more likely to be able 
to leverage its core resources and capabilities in related markets.  
Although firms will generally perform better when they expand into markets that are 
related to existing operations, market relatedness is far from deterministic and significant debate 
remains over both the importance of relatedness (Miller, 2006). Implementation of the expansion 
move may be just as important as market relatedness (Gary, 2005). Adaptation of some existing 
resources and capabilities will be required in order for the firm to succeed in the new market 
regardless of the level of relatedness. While market relatedness may make adaptation easier and 
hence raise the probability of appropriate adaptation, high relatedness does not guarantee, nor 
does low relatedness preclude, success in the new market. Many forays into highly related 
markets fail miserably, while firms like Honeywell, GE, Tyco International, and the Virgin 
Group (to name just a few) have repeatedly successfully adapted their resources or capabilities to 
new markets that appeared to have little in common with existing operations. Below, we argue 
 8 
 
 
that TCE yields valuable insights into how managerial incentives can facilitate or encumber 
successful adaptation to new markets, and also illuminates how capital structure is one of the 
primary determinants of managerial incentives. 
Adaptation and the Dynamics of TCE 
Although AT is the most commonly employed theoretical framework for studying 
corporate governance, TCE provides a highly complementary perspective (Lajili & Mahoney, 
2006; Williamson, 1988). Both AT and TCE focus on the application of managerial discretion, 
and both are concerned with incentives, contract structures, and the monitoring role of the board 
of directors. However, for AT the basic unit of analysis is the individual agent, and as such the 
primary focus is on ex ante incentive alignment to reduce residual loss. In contrast, for TCE the 
unit of analysis is the transaction, and the focal transaction in corporate governance is the money 
invested in the firm. Thus, in addition to ex ante incentive alignment, TCE also considers ex post 
adaptation to unfolding contingencies. Markets and hierarchies are two alternative forms of 
governance for guiding adaptation, and the appropriateness of each form is dependent upon how 
money invested in the firm is put to use. Thus, while AT primarily encompasses the use of 
incentives and monitoring to induce managers to make appropriate decisions, TCE more broadly 
considers how the nature of the firm’s strategic investments create contingencies that impact the 
appropriateness of alternative governance structures. 
TCE can serve as a valuable complement to the RBV because it prescribes the optimal 
form of governance given the type of resources and capabilities in which the firm invests 
(Williamson, 1991b, 1999). Although there is a variant of TCE, perhaps best exemplified by 
Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978), that is relatively static and primarily focused on rent-
seeking, there also exists another variant of the theory, best exemplified by Williamson (1999),  
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that is more dynamic and focused on ‘adaptive, sequential decision-making’ (Gibbons, 2005). 
According to this latter variant, the governance choice matters not so much because of current 
conditions (i.e., static transaction cost economizing), but rather because transacting parties are 
uncertain as to how conditions will unfold in the future. Transaction costs encompass all future 
expected costs and even opportunity costs. Furthermore, the costs of mal-adaptation (i.e., failure 
to adapt as circumstances change over time) may be the most severe of all transaction costs 
(Williamson, 1991a). Hence the most critical distinction between alternative governance 
structures pertains to the frameworks that they employ to facilitate adaptation to unfolding 
contingencies. The choice between market and hierarchical governance is critical not so much 
because of static transaction cost economizing, but because they offer polar opposite frameworks 
for guiding adaptation as conditions unfold (Williamson, 1999).  
Williamson (1991a) clearly outlines the distinction between market and hierarchical 
governance with regard to how they guide dispute resolution and adaptation as circumstances 
change over time. Market governance relies on contracts and rules to induce autonomous 
adaptation. Markets employ high-powered incentives because failure to adhere to the objective 
criteria outlined in the contract can result in costly and obtrusive court adjudication. While some 
simple courses of action may be prescribed by the contract, most critical organizational decisions 
are made autonomously by the transacting parties, motivated by both the need to remain 
compliant with the objective terms of the contract and the need to secure new contracts in the 
future. In contrast, hierarchical governance employs administrative discretion in order to achieve 
directed adaptation. Incentives within hierarchies are often muted relative to markets because 
outside court intervention is eschewed and disputes are instead resolved via the judicious 
tempering of administrative fiat with forbearance. Rather than allowing agents to make critical 
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organizational decisions autonomously, subject only to the constraint of complying with 
preexisting contracts, administrative hierarchies invest more heavily in monitoring both objective 
and subjective information, and subsequently use this information to actively direct adaptation. 
Management research has generally under-appreciated not only the inherently dynamic 
nature of TCE, but also the generality of the theory. While TCE has most commonly been 
applied to the question of whether a transaction should be internalized or outsourced to a market 
firm, the theory is actually a much more general theory of governance (Williamson, 1985). 
According to TCE, there are fundamentally two different ways in which the managers of the firm 
may be disciplined: through the rigid high powered incentives of market governance; or through 
the flexible and forbearing monitoring and guidance of the hierarchical governance wielded by 
the board of directors. If appropriate, incentives are a first-best solution because they involve 
lower monitoring costs and, moreover, managers necessarily have superior knowledge about the 
firm’s operations and opportunities than the monitors. However, the forbearance of hierarchical 
governance may be preferred when performance objectives cannot be pre-specified and hence 
the performance of managers must be evaluated flexibly and problems worked out as they arise 
via the discretionary assessment of subjective information by the board of directors.  
According to TCE, the best framework for guiding adaptation will depend upon the 
context, and hierarchical governance is best when investments entail high degrees of either 
specificity or uncertainty. First, in terms of specificity, firms will perform best in new markets 
when they can leverage key strategic resources into those markets (Delios & Beamish, 1999). To 
be strategic, a resource must be imperfectly mobile and imperfectly imitable, and hence strategic 
resources are almost necessarily firm specific (Chi, 1994). Furthermore, superior performance 
will depend upon making investments in learning about the new market and then adapting and 
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tailoring these resources to the new market. These investments will generally be highly specific 
to that market. Hierarchical governance is preferable when specificity is high because it can 
more effectively safeguard the continuity of the transaction than market governance.  
Second, leveraging the firm’s key strategic resources into new domains is a process that 
is fraught with uncertainty. The firm’s most valuable capabilities will be those tacit and socially 
complex capabilities that even the firm’s managers may not fully understand (Barney, 1991). 
Although they generally lead to high performance, managers cannot be sure that they will be able 
to successfully replicate such capabilities in a new context. Additionally, managing expansion 
requires the development and transfer of tacit knowledge between operations to exploit synergies 
(Kogut & Zander, 1993). Such knowledge involves hazards that are difficult to motivate using 
high-powered incentives. Hierarchical governance using monitoring and administrative devices 
should do a better job of motivating such knowledge sharing (Felin et al., 2009; Foss, 2006; 
Nickerson & Zenger, 2004). Furthermore, strategies may also have to be adapted after market 
entry. After entry, the firm may realize that it would be optimal to contract and outsource some 
activities or to expand and encompass others. High powered incentives with pre-specified 
performance targets will dissuade the type of experimentation with the firms’ resources and 
capabilities that can help maximize the returns from the new endeavor. Hierarchical governance 
is preferable when resources involve ongoing and intentional adaptation over time (Williamson, 
1991a), and thus firms will reap greater returns from diversification if managers are subject to 
the flexibility and forbearance of hierarchical governance. 
Financial Structure: A Primary Determinant of Governance Regimes 
Most corporate governance research focuses on considerations such as board composition 
and ownership structure, commonly overlooking the critical governance role played by the firm’s 
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capital structure (Barton & Gordon, 1987). Selecting the firm’s capital structure is one of the 
most important decisions made by senior managers (Mizruchi & Stearns, 1994) as it significantly 
influences the ability of managers to make discretionary investments (Jensen, 1986; Stearns & 
Mizruchi, 1993). TCE provides a useful lens for furthering our understanding of the governance 
implications of capital structure because it explicates how capital structure determines the 
primary governance regime to which managers are subjected. 
The focal transaction in corporate governance is the capital invested in the firm. Investors 
supply capital to a firm in the form of either debt or equity, which are really just alternative 
governance structures for safeguarding that capital (Williamson, 1988). Lenders safeguard their 
investment with market governance: the rigid rules of the debt contract. Debt subjects managers 
to high powered incentives because failure to adhere to the contract can result in financial 
distress, bankruptcy, and even organizational demise (Gilson, 1989), outcomes which can erode 
the personal wealth of managers and damage, if not ruin, their careers (Sutton & Callahan, 
1987). However, as long as managers conform to the objective terms of the debt contract, they 
are afforded the discretion to autonomously decide (i.e., without input from lenders) how best to 
adapt to unfolding contingencies. Managers face strong incentives to adapt appropriately not 
only to stay compliant with the covenants of the debt contract, but also to ensure that the debt 
can be repaid at the end of the contract, or a new debt contract can be secured. The suppliers of 
equity, in contrast, employ hierarchical governance to safeguard their investment (Williamson, 
1988). Performance incentives for managers are muted because the equity holders are not 
promised any specific returns, the equity never has to be repaid, and outside court intervention is 
eschewed. Instead, equity holders exercise ultimate discretion over managers via the board of 
directors, which tempers administrative fiat with forbearance in dealing with disputes or 
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performance shortfalls. Furthermore, the board invests heavily in gathering both objective and 
subjective information, which it uses to take an active role in guiding adaptation. 
Of course, all firms have equity holders and most firms have at least some debt. Whether 
managers are primarily disciplined by market or hierarchical governance depends on property 
rights. Equity holders are residual claimants. When debt levels are low, managers are primarily 
disciplined by the hierarchical governance of the equity holders. Even if the board does not 
diligently monitor managers, other mechanisms such as competition (Fama, 1980) and the 
market for corporate control (Manne, 1965) provide a measure of discipline. Thus, managers 
must ultimately care about performance, but will be relatively free to experiment and adopt a 
medium to long term perspective. However, lenders are priority claimants. As debt levels rise, 
the pressing market demands of lenders come to the forefront, overshadowing the hierarchical 
governance of equity holders and engendering high powered incentives (Jensen, 1986). Thus, 
while factors such as board composition or ownership structure are important, their relevance is 
diminished if managers are focused on the high powered, short term, incentives of debt. 
Likewise, diligent monitoring by boards may be superfluous or possibly even counter-productive 
if managerial efforts are primarily focused on meeting the pressing market demands of lenders.  
Our theory proposes that the hierarchical governance of equity provides the most 
appropriate form of governance for firms that are leveraging their resources and capabilities into 
new markets. The TCE logic lends itself to two types of tests regarding such discriminating 
matches between the situational circumstances and the form of governance. The first is that firms 
will tend to make the efficient choice as long as the environment is sufficiently competitive 
(Klein, 2005), and hence the form of governance selected will depend upon the characteristics of 
the investments being made. In this regard, TCE would make the same prediction as AT in terms 
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of hypothesis 1. However, TCE also lends itself to a second test which predicts an interaction 
between the characteristics of the investment, the governance choice, and performance. 
Interestingly, TCE suggests that if firms always made the correct governance choice, 
there would be no empirically detectable relationship between governance and performance 
(Masten, 1993). Performance in a competitive environment is always relative, so if virtually 
every firm made the correct governance choice then doing so would confer no competitive 
advantage and hence there would be no empirical relationship between the governance choice 
and performance even though it may be an important decision. However, due to both mistakes 
and governance inseparabilities (Argyres & Liebeskind, 1999), misfits between governance and 
the characteristics of the investment do occur and should be associated with lower performance 
due to higher costs and less efficient adaptation. In our case, a firm’s existing capital structure 
may not be optimal for market expansion. If that firm expands into new markets, the high levels 
of debt and the ensuing high-powered incentives may constrain the managers’ ability to explore 
and capitalize on new opportunities as they arise. Therefore, while a firm may still be relatively 
successful in its expansion efforts, on average it will realize lower returns, and hence lower firm 
value, when managers are subjected to market governance instead of hierarchical governance. 
Hypothesis 2: Debt negatively moderates the relationship between increases in 
diversification and firm value.  
 
We contend that high levels of debt expose managers to the pressures of market 
governance, thereby attenuating the discretion and motivation that mangers have to experiment 
and adapt when leveraging resources into a new market. While financial and agency theories 
predict relationships between diversification and debt, we are not aware of any other theories that 
would readily predict the relationship proposed in hypothesis 2. According to AT, debt should 
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constrain excessive diversification (Johnson, 1996), thereby enhancing the performance returns 
to diversification. In marked contrast, a TCE perspective (augmented by the RBV) emphasizes 
the ex post challenges of diversification and argues that debt can be harmful when firms leverage 
strategic resources into new markets because it inhibits discretion and adaptive experimentation. 
Debt and Diversification: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly 
While our central argument is that debt will be detrimental to firm value when firms 
expand into new markets, both the RBV and TCE suggest that the story is much more nuanced 
and that this relationship may vary according to other considerations. According to TCE, the 
detrimental effects of the market governance of debt will intensify as exchange hazards (i.e., 
asset specificity and uncertainty) increase. We have previously argued that virtually all market 
expansion efforts will entail considerable uncertainty and some degree of specific investments. 
However, the RBV can help us understand how these exchange hazards vary with firm strategy.  
Numerous strategy scholars have argued that pursuing an R&D intensive strategy raises 
exchange hazards for firms, and hence debt is particularly bad for such firms (Balakrishnan & 
Fox, 1993; David et al., 2008; Kochhar, 1996; O'Brien, 2003; Simerly & Li, 2000; Vincente-
Lorente, 2001). Although R&D creates valuable knowledge-based resources, those resources are 
best used in conjunction with the firm’s complimentary resources (Helfat, 1994) and lose 
considerable value if redeployed elsewhere (Kochhar & David, 1996). In addition to being 
highly specific, investments in R&D also tend to be characterized by distant and highly uncertain 
payoffs (Hill & Snell, 1988). Firms will generally attempt to leverage their existing capabilities 
into new markets that they enter. Thus, if a firm pursues an R&D intensive strategy, the 
investments it makes in entering a new market will likely be knowledge intensive, highly 
specific, and entail considerable uncertainty. The market governance of debt is ill-suited for such 
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investments because it impedes the development and transfer of tacit knowledge between 
operations and undermines both the motivation and ability to experiment, adapt, and capitalize 
on emerging opportunities. Thus, while our theory suggests that debt is generally bad for 
diversifying firms, it is downright ‘ugly’ for R&D intensive firms. Accordingly, we propose:  
Hypothesis 3: The detrimental effect of debt on increases in diversification will be 
stronger for R&D intensive firms.  
 
The detrimental effects of debt on increases in diversification should also vary with the 
type of debt the firm utilizes. Thus far, our description of debt has conformed to descriptions 
offered by Williamson (1988) and Jensen (1986). While all forms of debt do share certain critical 
characteristics, there are important differences between bank debt and bond debt (for a review 
see Boot, 2000). In fact, the classical description of debt pertains mainly to bond debt, whereas a 
bank may be more likely to employ hierarchical governance. Bond holders rely on the rigid rules 
of the debt contract because they have no alternative: as bonds are generally diffusely held, 
individual bondholders lack the incentive to monitor the firm, and it is costlier for joint action by 
bondholders to renegotiate debt contracts. In contrast, banks tend to have more concentrated 
holdings, allowing them to more easily renegotiate debt contracts if the client firm encounters 
financial difficulties. Banks also typically form a close relationship with their clients, which 
allows them to gather more detailed subjective information on the firm, and often further garners 
them a seat on the firm’s board of directors (Kaplan & Minton, 1994). Finally, banks may even 
use their influence to take an active role in guiding adaptation. The close monitoring, ability to 
exercise administrative discretion, and be forbearing in the face of performance shortfalls makes 
the governance of bank debt more akin to a hierarchy than a market (David et al., 2008).  
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Prior research has noted that banks influence diversification strategy (Ramaswamy et al., 
2002). We propose that the choice between bank debt and bond debt should have significant 
performance implications for firms expanding into new markets. If the relationship between 
diversification and capital structure was primarily about the cost of capital, then we might expect 
bond debt to yield marginally superior performance because it generally entails a slightly lower 
interest rate (at least for large firms) than bank debt. However, if the governance exerted by bank 
debt is more akin to hierarchical governance than it is to the market governance of bonds, then 
bank debt should not hinder the returns to changes in diversification as severely as do bonds.  
Hypothesis 4: Bond debt is more detrimental for firms increasing diversification than 
bank debt. 
 
While thus far we have focused on how capital structure relates to increases in 
diversification, the RBV suggests that debt may have very different implications for firms that 
are either decreasing diversification or simply managing a stable but diversified portfolio of 
markets. Increases in both product and geographic diversification will necessitate that the firm 
make specific investments in learning about the new market, possibly tailoring their product or 
service to that market and continuing to experiment and adapt after entry. Although many of the 
investments made in entering a new market may be market-specific, and hence sunk, some of the 
investments may be fungible enough to be redeployed from an abandoned market back into 
ongoing segments if the firm contracts (Anand & Singh, 1997; Helfat & Eisenhardt, 2004). 
Although market contraction could be thought of as simply the ‘reverse’ of market expansion, 
the RBV suggests that expansion and contraction are very asymmetric processes. 
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As discussed earlier, entering new markets entails significant uncertainty, and 
performance will likely improve when managers are afforded more freedom to react flexibly, 
experiment, and potentially delay short-term payoffs in favor of newly discovered greater long-
term payoffs. While hierarchical governance can potentially provide such latitudes, the pressures 
of market governance usurp such motivations. In contrast, redeploying resources and capabilities 
back into mature operating segments is rather mechanistic in comparison to leveraging them into 
new markets. As managers are highly familiar with the existing markets, there is significantly 
less uncertainty, much less need to adapt and experiment, and the resources being redeployed are 
more fungible (i.e., less specific). Hence, the market governance of debt is not nearly as 
consequential to market contraction as it is to market expansion. 
Hypothesis 5:  Debt is more detrimental to increases in diversification than it is to 
decreases in diversification. 
 
Similarly, debt may not necessarily be detrimental to diversified firms that have stopped 
aggressively expanding and are focused on managing a stable portfolio of businesses. As noted 
earlier, debt has numerous potential benefits, including managerial discipline (Jensen 1986; 
Williamson, 1988), tax benefits, and an overall lower cost of capital (Barton & Gordon, 1987). In 
fact, many diversified firms capitalize on their diversified earnings streams and attempt to reap 
these benefits by adopting more leverage in their capital structure (Barton & Gordon, 1988; Kim 
et al., 1993; Kochhar & Hitt, 1998; Lim et al., 2009; Low & Chen, 2004; Lowe et al., 1994). 
While our theory predicts that the market governance of debt is detrimental to firms that are 
actively leveraging their resources and capabilities into new markets, it should be much less 
consequential once the need for rapid experimentation and adaptation abates. Indeed, the benefits 
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of debt may well outweigh the costs under such circumstances. Thus, while we expect that debt 
will generally be bad for firms expanding into new markets, it will be ‘less bad’ and possibly 
even ‘good’ for mature firms that are managing a diversified but stable portfolio of markets. 
Hypothesis 6: Debt is more detrimental to firm value for firms that are increasing 
diversification than it is for firms with a stable level of diversification. 
 
Methods 
Data Sources and Sample  
In order to test our theory, we require a sample of firms with detailed financial 
information that distinguishes between bank debt and bond. While such a distinction is not 
readily available for U.S. firms, such information is available in the Pacific-Basin Capital 
Markets (PACAP) Database for Japanese firms. As we believe that our theory should apply to 
both geographic and product expansion, we combined the PACAP data with two different data 
sources to produce measures of both international and product diversification. 
We constructed our sample by starting with all firms listed in the PACAP Japan database 
that had market value information available from 1991 to 2001, the years for which 
diversification information was available. As small firms may be effectively locked out of the 
foreign markets, we deleted 1081 observations for firms that had book value of equity of less 
than 3 billion Yen (see Anderson & Makhija, 1999). We also excluded firms in the highly 
regulated financial, public utilities, and communications sectors (443 observations). This left us 
with a sample of 1986 firms and 16,363 observations. We then merged this sample with all firms 
that were listed in either of the annual publications Japanese Overseas Investments (which was 
used to compute international diversification) or the Japan Company Handbook (which was used 
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to compute product diversification), producing a sample of 11759 firm/year observations. 
However, the information used to compute product diversification (i.e., from the Japan Company 
Handbook) was available for slightly fewer firms, and occasional missing data items slightly 
reduced the number of observations used in models reported. Finally, data for the variable R&D 
was not available in PACAP and was imported from the NIKKEI NEEDS database. 
Variables 
Our dependent variable, performance, was measured using the firm’s market-to-book 
ratio. This measure, which closely corresponds to Tobin’s Q (Chung & Pruitt, 1994), is 
appropriate because it incorporates both current performance and also expectations of future cash 
flows. This measure is calculated as the market value of the firm (MVF) divided by total assets, 
where the MVF is computed as the sum of the book value of debt and the market value of equity. 
As performance was highly skewed by large values, we transformed it by taking the natural log. 
Likewise, the independent variable bank debt represents the sum of all bank loans divided by the 
MVF, and the variable bond debt is the sum of all bonds and long term notes divided by the 
MVF. Leverage is total debt (i.e., bank loans plus bond debt) divided by the total MVF, and the 
variable R&D is the ratio of the firm’s R&D expenditures to sales.  
To measure the extent of a firm’s international diversification, we collected data on 
Japanese firms’ overseas subsidiaries from the publication Japanese Overseas Investments. 
Then, following Delios, Xu and Beamish (2008), we calculated an entropy-based measure of 
diversification based upon the concentration of the firms subsidiaries across different geographic 
markets. Similarly, to measure product diversification, we collected data on each firm’s product-
segment sales, classified using three-digit SIC codes from the Japan Company Handbook 
(Delios & Beamish, 1999), then computed diversification via the entropy measure (Palepu, 
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1985). Once we had measures of product and international diversification, we then computed 
measures of change in diversification. However, change scores could reflect random variation 
instead of genuine change (Bergh & Fairbank, 2002), and in our case yearly fluctuations in sales 
across segments could falsely indicate changes in diversification. Thus, we first smoothed the 
base time series measures of diversification with a moving average function, and then computed 
change scores for each measure. The variable Δdiversification is the year to year change for each 
type of diversification, computed as difference between the focal year and the previous year. 
Although correlation between a simple change score and other independent variables can induce 
problems (Bergh & Fairbank, 2002), Table 1 suggests that this is not a concern in our data. We 
also created two directional additional measures of change in diversification. Following Greve 
(2003), we employed a spline function whereby ↑diversification represents the positive values of 
Δdiversification with the negative values replaced by zeros, while ↓diversification is the negative 
values of Δdiversification with the positive values replaced by zeros. 
We controlled for a number of other factors that might impact either diversification or 
performance. Free cash flow is calculated as the ratio of operating income less taxes, interest and 
dividends paid divided by total assets. The variable fixed assets is defined as net fixed assets 
divided by total assets. Cash is total cash and marketable securities divided by total assets, and 
size is the natural log of total firm assets. Volatility assesses the instability of the firm’s earnings, 
and is measured as the standard deviation of return on assets over the previous five years, and 
firm growth is the year over year change in firm sales. As ownership structure can strongly 
influence the strategic decisions of Japanese firms (Ahmadjian & Robbins, 2005; O'Brien & 
David, 2014), we also controlled for the ownership structure of the firm with the variables 
foreign ownership, which is the total number of shares owned by foreigners divided by total 
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shares; financial ownership, which is the total number of shares owned by banks and insurance 
companies divided by total shares; and corporate ownership, which is the total number of shares 
owned by Japanese business corporations (excluding financial institutions) divided by total 
shares. Furthermore, since keiretsu membership can have important governance implications for 
Japanese firms (Kim et al., 2004), we include the dummy variable keiretsu, which equals one if 
the firm is a member of a keiretsu and zero otherwise. We also control for the square of our 
various debt measures to account for potential nonlinear effects of debt. In addition to the firm 
level control variables, we also included two industry level control variables: industry 
performance, the median value of the variable performance for all firms in each industry; and 
industry growth, the year over year growth rate in sales for the median firm in each industry.  
Analysis 
Unobserved heterogeneity is a concern because our data contains multiple observations 
per firm. Furthermore, some of our independent variables (most notably capital structure and 
diversification) are potentially endogenous. To address these problems, we employ the 
Hausman-Taylor instrumental variables (IV) regression model. This approach offers two key 
benefits for analyzing our sample. First, similar to a fixed effects model, it accounts for 
unobserved heterogeneity by allowing for correlation between regressors and the individual 
[firm] effects. However, unlike a fixed effects model, it allows for the estimation of regressors 
that are invariant over time within individuals [or firms] (Greene, 2003). Second, it accounts for 
endogeneity by using both the between and the within variation of the exogenous variables as 
instruments for the specified endogenous variables (Baltagi, 2001). 
Finally, it should be noted that when performance is the dependent variable, we used 
contemporaneous measures for the independent variables because performance is measured on 
 23 
 
 
the last day of the [fiscal] year and can adjust rapidly to changes in expected future performance. 
However, when diversification is the dependent variable, simultaneity is a greater concern 
because the levels of debt and diversification might both rise during the year if debt is used to 
fund increases in diversification. Thus, for these models the independent variables were lagged 
one year (e.g. diversification in year t is modeled as a function of capital structure on the last day 
of year t-1). Descriptive statistics for our sample are given in Table 1. 
Results 
The results of our empirical analyses for international and product diversification are 
given in Tables 2 and 3, respectively. All models in these tables used the Huasman-Taylor IV 
regression models and treat our measures of leverage and diversification (when used as an 
independent variable) as endogenous. For all regressions, the Sargan-Hansen overidentification 
test statistic was insignificant, thus confirming two critical assumptions of IV regressions: that 
the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term (i.e., they are exogenous), and that they are 
correctly excluded from the estimated equation. Model 1 in Tables 2 and 3 present the results of 
our analysis of the determinants of changes in international and product diversification, 
respectively. Interestingly, most of the control variables have a weak effect, at best. However, 
leverage does have a significant negative effect on changes in both international (p<0.01) and 
product diversification (p<0.05). Hence, we find support for hypothesis 1, and it would appear 
that higher levels of debt do indeed generally constrain future changes in diversification. 
Models 2 through 8 of Table 2 present the results of our analysis of the impact of changes 
in international diversification on firm value. Model 2 reveals that Δdiversification has a positive 
and significant main effect on performance and leverage has a significant negative effect on 
performance, although the significant coefficient for the square term indicates that it is a 
 24 
 
 
nonlinear effect. However, taking the first derivative of the regression equation with respect to 
leverage and solving for the inflection point reveals that the relationship is monotonically 
negative within the observed range of the variable leverage. Model 3 adds in the interaction 
between Δdiversification and leverage, which is found to be negative and significant (p<0.01). 
This supports hypothesis 2, and indicates that the market governance of leverage reduces the 
benefits that firms accrue from increases in diversification.  
Models 4 and 5 test hypothesis 3 by splitting the sample based on R&D intensity. Model 
4 reports the results for the R&D intensive subsample (defined as R&D to sales ratio greater than 
5%) and model 5 reports the results for the remaining firms. Although the interaction between 
Δdiversification and leverage and is significant in both subsamples, it is almost six times larger 
in Model 4. This difference between the two coefficients is significant (p<0.01) and supports 
hypothesis 3. Furthermore, consistent with hypothesis 4, model 6 shows that bond debt impairs 
the benefits of increases in diversification significantly more than does bank debt (Chi-
square=5.79, p<0.05). Model 7 tests hypothesis 5 by also controlling for the absolute level of 
diversification. In support of our hypothesis, the interaction between Δdiversification and 
leverage significantly more strongly negative (Chi-square=46.37, p<0.01) than the interaction 
between diversification and leverage. Interestingly, when controlling for the effects of changes in 
diversification, the interaction between the absolute level of diversification and leverage is 
actually positive. This suggests that debt can have benefits for diversified firms that have a stable 
level of diversification. Finally, model 8 separates out the effects of increases in diversification 
from decreases. Consistent with hypothesis 6, the significant negative coefficient for the 
interaction between ↑diversification and leverage is significantly more strongly negative (Chi-
square=14.71, p<0.01) than the insignificant interaction between ↓diversification and leverage.  
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Models 2 through 8 of Table 3 replicate the results of models 2 through 8 of Table 2 
using product diversification instead of international diversification. It is interesting to note that 
product diversification also has a positive main effect on performance. However, this should not 
be surprising, as in Japan conglomerates tend to exist at the keiretsu level but not at the firm 
level. For example, in our data there are 18 different firms (each a distinct legal entity with its 
own stock, managers and board) that are all members of the Mitsubishi keiretsu. Furthermore, 
during the time frame of our study, each of these individual firms tend to use unconsolidated 
subsidiaries for unrelated diversification that they engage in, while consolidating the results for 
related diversification. Thus, our measure of product diversification is largely a measure of 
related diversification. Hence, our results (unsurprisingly) reveal that more related diversification 
leads to improved performance. In terms of the tests of our hypotheses, the results for product 
diversification are very similar to those of international diversification.  
The only noteworthy differences in Table 3 versus Table 2 are that the interactions 
between the level of diversification and leverage is slightly weaker and only marginally 
significant, and the interaction between decreases in diversification and leverage is significant 
and negative. However, the results of all of our hypothesis tests are all substantively equivalent. 
Hence, overall the results provide strong support for our hypotheses. Finally, we note that in 
unreported models, we also tried interacting our measures of changes in diversification with the 
square terms for our measures of debt, but found these interactions to be insignificant.  
The benefits of matching governance structures to the context are not only statistically 
significant, but also economically significant. By taking the first derivative of the regression 
equation in model 8 of Table 2 with respect to the ↑diversification, we can compute the marginal 
effect that increases in international diversification have on firm performance at varying levels of 
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debt. Doing so reveals that as leverage rises from 0 to 0.50, the slope of the relationship between 
↑diversification and performance would fall from a healthy 0.86 to a -0.21. Repeating this 
analysis for product diversification shows that the slope would fall from 0.91 to -0.31. Thus, debt 
influences not only the magnitude of the benefits firms reap from diversification, but can actually 
influence whether those returns are generally positive or negative.  
Discussion and Conclusions 
We have argued that TCE can provide a useful lens for understanding whether a firm will 
reap benefits from leveraging its resources and capabilities into new markets. Managers will 
generally be unsure of their capabilities and the applicability of the firm’s resources when their 
firm expands, and may well need to experiment and react flexibly and quickly as conditions 
unfold. Under such conditions, the rigid and unforgiving nature of market governance, with its 
high powered incentives, can inhibit both the ability and the willingness of managers to act 
quickly and to experiment in the new domain. Thus, shielding managers from the rigors of 
market governance can help ensure that firms reap greater benefits from their expansion efforts. 
We argue that TCE and the RBV are highly complementary in explaining the success of 
corporate strategies. Organizational capabilities differ in the nature of hazards they pose and will 
yield the highest returns when they are governed by mechanisms that best facilitate adaptation as 
contingencies evolve in the future. We explain that the capabilities underlying successful 
diversification require development and transfer in order to exploit synergies, and therefore 
involve considerable hazards. Market governance utilizing high-powered incentives is not 
conducive to the ongoing adaptation needed for successful implementation. Instead, hierarchical 
governance mechanisms utilizing elaborate monitoring and administrative mechanisms provide 
appropriate safeguards for guiding the adaptation needed for successful diversification. 
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The discretion to engage in experimentation and capitalize on opportunities as they arise 
facilitates successful diversification. We find that debt, which constrains managerial discretion 
over how resources can be deployed, reduces the benefits that firms accrue from diversification. 
However, we also find that this relationship needs to be contextualized in several regards, as debt 
is not always necessarily bad for diversified firms. First, we find that the detrimental effects of 
debt on increases in diversification will vary with the firm’s strategy. Specifically, we find that 
the negative consequences of debt are amplified for R&D intensive firms and relatively mild for 
firms with a low R&D intensity. Second, we note that debt is not homogeneous, and its effect on 
diversification depends on the nature of debt. In contrast to bond holders, banks tend to form 
closer relationships, monitor their clients, and even take an active role in guiding adaptation. 
Accordingly, bank debt does not reduce the benefits of diversification to the extent that bond 
debt does. Third, we argue and find that the resource deployment and redeployment that 
accompanies changes in diversification is an asymmetric process, such that debt is much more 
harmful for increases in diversification than it is for decreases in diversification.  
Fourth, our theory suggests that the negative aspects of debt are most pronounced during 
market expansion and shortly after, when the firm is still learning and experimenting. However, 
the discipline provided by debt may be beneficial to a diversified firm that is no longer entering 
new markets and is focusing on improving the efficiency of its operations. Accordingly, we find 
that debt can potentially be beneficial to a diversified firm that is not actively expanding into new 
ones. We believe that this is an important finding because most previous research examining the 
link between capital structure and diversification has focused on whether diversification allows 
firms to carry more debt. Yet, as Low and Chen (2004) point out, the evidence that product 
diversification leads to higher debt levels is scant, and the evidence that international 
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diversification does so is equivocal. By focusing not on how much debt diversified firms can 
carry, but how much they should carry, our research not only helps highlight why the capital 
structure decision is so important, but also may help explain the mixed results.  
We built our theoretical arguments on general theories of governance which, although 
they were largely developed in the U.S., proved useful in predicting diversification performance 
in Japan. Despite this, the generalizability of our results is worth further consideration and future 
empirical examination. As our theories are general, our results for the effects of capital structure 
on changes in diversification should generalize to any country or time where the institutional or 
legal context allows lenders to exercise market governance over their investments in the firm, 
and where performance in new markets is contingent upon learning and adapting key resources 
and capabilities to those markets. Hence, our theory should generalize to any well-developed 
capitalist economy where the board of directors has, at least, a fiduciary duty to act in the best 
interests of shareholders and where contract law and property rights protections give lenders the 
power to force a firm into bankruptcy. Furthermore, our results regarding the differences 
between bond debt and bank debt should generalize to any context where firms can engage in 
‘relational banking’, thereby allowing banks to exercise a more hierarchical form of governance 
over their investments in the firm. Thus, our theory implies that debt will not be as bad for 
increases in diversification in contexts where banks are the dominant providers of corporate debt 
(such as France and Germany) as it is where bond debt is dominant (such as the U.S. and the 
U.K.). However, even in the U.S., some large corporations do rely heavily on bank debt (Stearns 
& Mizruchi, 1993). Therefore, we believe that our results should be broadly applicable. 
While we do believe that our results should generalize to other contexts, we do 
acknowledge some limitations of our data. First, our sample was limited to the years 1991-2001 
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because the sources that were used to construct the diversification measures changed the way 
they report segment information in the early 2000s. Hence, we would not be able to form 
consistent time series, which is critical to constructing a measure of change in diversification. 
However, we are interested in uncovering theoretical truths that apply across both countries and 
time, and we have no reason to believe that the relationships we investigate would be unique to 
the 1990s. Second, endogeneity is always an important concern in empirical studies like ours. 
While we believe that the Hausman-Taylor IV regressions were well-suited for the nature of our 
data, it does handle the instrumentation of endogenous variables in a rather mechanistic manner. 
While only a controlled experiment with random assignment (which is not practical for topics 
such as this) can definitively establish causality, more research employing a diversity of samples 
and econometric approaches would be helpful in corroborating our findings.  
Finally, we suggest some potentially fruitful avenues for extending our work. We argue 
that the flexible and forbearing governance of the board of directors is overshadowed by the 
market governance of priority claimants when debt is high. Perhaps the mixed results often 
found in corporate governance research (Coles et al., 2001; Daily et al., 2003) arise because the 
most commonly studied variables in the corporate governance literature mainly pertain to 
hierarchical governance, and hence may be of little consequence when market governance is 
high. When examining corporate governance, the pressure exerted by owners (David et al., 
2001), the significance of the composition of the board of directors (Dalton et al., 1998), or the 
nuances of the CEO’s [generally generous] pay package (Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997), may 
pale in comparison to capital structure, for the ire of shareholders is but a pillow in comparison 
to the dagger wielded by lenders. Future research should more closely scrutinize a firm’s capital 
structure to identify when the board of directors really matters (Beatty & Zajac, 1994).  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Mean St.Dev (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
(1) Performance -0.174 0.487
(2) ΔIntl. Diver. 0.007 0.042 0.07
(3) ΔProd. Diver. 0.004 0.037 0.07 0.47
(4) Leverage 0.335 0.243 -0.37 -0.09 -0.07
(5) Bond Debt 0.101 0.111 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.26
(6) Bank Debt 0.234 0.239 -0.36 -0.09 -0.07 0.89 -0.20
(7) Free Cash 0.004 0.026 0.17 -0.01 -0.04 -0.26 -0.10 -0.21
(8) Cash 0.103 0.085 0.17 0.03 0.04 -0.33 -0.04 -0.31 0.11
(9) Size 11.80 1.252 0.18 -0.09 -0.08 0.12 0.27 -0.01 0.05 -0.06
(10) Fixed Assets 0.255 0.133 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.01 -0.28 -0.06
(11) R&D 0.027 0.058 0.12 -0.03 -0.04 -0.14 0.00 -0.14 0.07 0.00 0.07 -0.04
(12) Volatility 0.016 0.013 0.15 0.00 0.01 -0.10 -0.09 -0.05 -0.19 0.12 -0.20 -0.02 0.12
(13) Firm Growth -0.011 0.108 0.18 0.05 0.05 -0.20 -0.03 -0.19 0.35 0.02 0.04 -0.02 -0.08 -0.09
(14) Frgn. Owner. 0.077 0.088 0.35 -0.03 -0.04 -0.32 -0.01 -0.32 0.20 0.10 0.37 -0.09 0.18 0.06 0.11
(15) Fin. Owner. 0.373 0.147 0.31 -0.02 -0.02 -0.10 0.23 -0.21 0.00 0.00 0.48 -0.03 0.08 -0.13 0.05 0.19
(16) Corp. Owner. 0.273 0.168 -0.20 0.07 0.07 0.07 -0.12 0.13 -0.05 -0.04 -0.29 0.09 -0.16 0.02 -0.01 -0.39 -0.66
(17) Keiretsu 0.159 0.366 0.09 -0.04 -0.03 0.14 0.18 0.06 -0.03 -0.18 0.47 0.07 0.06 -0.10 -0.02 0.14 0.27 -0.19
(18) Ind. Growth -0.008 0.050 0.10 0.04 0.03 -0.09 0.00 -0.10 0.16 0.01 0.03 -0.01 -0.10 -0.06 0.49 0.05 0.02 0.00 -0.02
(19) Ind. Perform. -0.221 0.282 0.55 0.14 0.14 -0.29 0.05 -0.32 -0.15 0.12 -0.03 0.11 -0.05 0.12 0.11 0.05 0.19 -0.01 0.04 0.20
n = 9602
Variable
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Table 2: Instrumental Variables Regressions on International Diversification  
 
  Diversification -0.17 **
ΔDiversification 0.24 ** 0.64 ** 2.25 ** 0.47 ** 0.78 ** 0.65 **
↑Diversification 0.86 **
↓Diversification 0.20
Leverage -0.02 ** -1.74 ** -1.72 ** -2.30 ** -1.61 ** -1.87 ** -1.70 **
Leverage2 1.78 ** 1.74 ** 2.20 ** 1.67 ** 1.73 ** 1.74 **
Bond Debt -0.36 **
Bond Debt2 -0.42 **
Bank Debt -1.40 **
Bank Debt2 1.51 **
Free Cash Flow 0.02 1.87 ** 1.85 ** 1.13 ** 1.96 ** 1.84 ** 1.81 ** 1.84 **
Cash 0.02 * 0.20 ** 0.19 ** 0.17 0.18 ** 0.13 ** 0.18 ** 0.20 **
Size 0.00 ** -0.03 ** -0.03 ** -0.02 -0.06 ** -0.03 ** -0.02 ** -0.03 **
Fixed Assets 0.00 -0.11 ** -0.11 ** -0.27 * -0.09 + -0.07 + -0.10 * -0.11 **
R&D 0.05 ** 0.32 ** 0.32 ** 0.15 0.09 0.31 ** 0.32 ** 0.32 **
Volatility -0.07 + 2.13 ** 2.14 ** 2.31 ** 1.95 ** 2.35 ** 2.12 ** 2.13 **
Firm Growth 0.01 0.09 ** 0.09 ** 0.06 0.11 ** 0.09 ** 0.09 ** 0.09 **
Foreign Owner. -0.01 1.82 ** 1.82 ** 1.69 ** 1.62 ** 1.80 ** 1.82 ** 1.82 **
Financial Owner. 0.00 1.22 ** 1.22 ** 1.29 ** 1.13 ** 1.17 ** 1.23 ** 1.22 **
Corporate Owner. 0.00 0.75 ** 0.75 ** 0.84 ** 0.66 ** 0.71 ** 0.74 ** 0.75 **
Keiretsu 0.00 0.08 * 0.07 * 0.06 0.11 ** 0.08 * 0.07 * 0.07 *
Indus. Growth 0.00 -0.16 * -0.16 * -0.29 + -0.08 -0.16 * -0.16 * -0.16 *
Indus. Perform. -0.01 + 0.66 ** 0.66 ** 0.65 ** 0.66 ** 0.66 ** 0.67 ** 0.66 **
ΔDiver. x Leverage -1.31 ** -5.87 ** -0.98 ** -1.31 **
ΔDiv. x Bond Debt -2.58 **
ΔDiv. x Bank Debt -1.46 **
Divers. x Leverage 0.28 **
↑Div. x Leverage -2.13 **
↓Div. x Leverage -0.13
Observations
Wald Chi-square 753.8 ** 17586 ** 17673 ** 1980 ** 15716 ** 17249 ** 17779 ** 17711 **
+ p<0.10; * p<0.05;  ** p<0.01 (two-tailed)
Model 8
11,455
Model 4
1,887 11,4559,568
Model 6 Model 7
11,455
Model 1 Model 2
10,441 11,455
Model 5Model 3
11,455
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Table 3: Instrumental Variables Regressions on Product Diversification 
 
  Diversification -0.04
ΔDiversification 0.16 * 0.75 ** 2.07 ** 0.62 ** 0.86 ** 0.75 **
↑Diversification 0.91 **
↓Diversification 0.45 *
Leverage -0.01 * -1.80 ** -1.77 ** -2.62 ** -1.63 ** -1.84 ** -1.75 **
Leverage2 1.83 ** 1.78 ** 2.55 ** 1.68 ** 1.77 ** 1.78 **
Bond Debt -0.41 **
Bond Debt2 -0.33 *
Bank Debt -1.38 **
Bank Debt2 1.48 **
Free Cash Flow -0.02 1.81 ** 1.78 ** 0.81 ** 1.93 ** 1.79 ** 1.78 ** 1.78 **
Cash 0.02 ** 0.17 ** 0.17 ** 0.27 ** 0.15 ** 0.11 * 0.16 ** 0.16 **
Size 0.00 ** -0.03 ** -0.03 ** -0.02 -0.06 ** -0.03 ** -0.03 ** -0.03 **
Fixed Assets 0.00 -0.10 * -0.10 * -0.20 + -0.09 + -0.06 -0.10 * -0.11 *
R&D 0.02 0.30 ** 0.31 ** 0.11 -0.10 0.29 ** 0.31 ** 0.31 **
Volatility 0.03 2.01 ** 1.99 ** 2.40 ** 1.82 ** 2.28 ** 1.98 ** 1.99 **
Firm Growth 0.01 ** 0.07 ** 0.07 ** 0.04 0.09 ** 0.07 ** 0.07 ** 0.07 **
Foreign Owner. 0.00 1.92 ** 1.93 ** 1.68 ** 1.74 ** 1.91 ** 1.93 ** 1.93 **
Financial Owner. 0.01 * 1.26 ** 1.27 ** 1.27 ** 1.17 ** 1.21 ** 1.27 ** 1.27 **
Corporate Owner. 0.01 * 0.80 ** 0.81 ** 0.85 ** 0.69 ** 0.77 ** 0.81 ** 0.81 **
Keiretsu 0.00 0.08 * 0.08 * 0.09 0.12 ** 0.08 * 0.08 * 0.08 *
Indus. Growth 0.00 -0.11 -0.12 + -0.22 -0.04 -0.13 + -0.12 + -0.12 +
Indus. Perform. -0.01 + 0.66 ** 0.66 ** 0.57 ** 0.65 ** 0.66 ** 0.66 ** 0.66 **
ΔDiver. x Leverage -1.89 ** -6.12 ** -1.67 ** -1.89 **
ΔDiv. x Bond Debt -3.06 **
ΔDiv. x Bank Debt -1.85 **
Divers. x Leverage 0.08 +
↑Div. x Leverage -2.43 **
↓Div. x Leverage -1.06 *
Observations
Wald Chi-square 578.7 ** 14309 ** 14436 ** 1942 ** 12582 ** 13954 ** 14437 ** 14446 **
+ p<0.10; * p<0.05;  ** p<0.01 (two-tailed)
Model 7 Model 8
8,850 9,602 9,602 1,713 7,889 9,602 9,602 9,602
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
 
 
 
 
 
